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Abstract
Network Effects and Spatial Autoregression in Mode Choice Models:
Three Essays in Urban Transportation Economics

Frank Goetzke

Network analysis in transportation economics has traditionally focused on congestion as
a negative externality stemming from supply-side capacity constraints. In my first paper paper, an
analytical mode choice model is developed to examine the demand-side network effects. The
assumption behind the approach is that, because of social network effects, the utility of people
taking the mode increases with its mode share. It is found that social network effects change the
modal aggregate demand curve for the mode to an inverted u-shape. This result has far-reaching
policy consequences, since multiple equilibria become a possibility, causing positive externalities
and path-dependency.
Transportation planners have always been aware of positive network effects in public
transit use, which can be attributed to the fact that people choose transit, because other people
already take it. In my second essay, I employ a spatially autoregressive mode choice mode to
econometrically test for the existence of social network effects. It is found that the coefficient
estimate for transit use network effects is positive and significantly different from zero.
Furthermore, if social network effects are not included, it can be shown that an omitted variable
bias is introduced into the model, which can lead to a systematic error in travel forecasts.
The third essay explains municipal differences in bicycle mode share with social network
effects. Using data from the nation-wide travel behaviour survey, Mobility in Germany 2002, a
binary logistic regression model was developed to identify in how much a city-specific “biking
culture” has an impact on the city’s bike modal split. To avoid endogeneity of the biking culture
variable, a social network effects instrument was developed. It was found that not only bicycle
infrastructure, but also social network effects change municipal bike mode share. Further results
were that work/educational and leisure trips depend less on social network effects than other trip
purposes. The outcome of this research has significant policy implications, such as, that
transportation planners can target biking culture in a city as a mean to improve bike mode share.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

1

During the last decade it became more acceptable to analyze
sociological topics with economic tools. In the field of social interactions,
economists began looking at herd behavior, cultural conventions, foreign
language learning, gift giving and fashion. The concepts of social network or
spillover effects are the centerpiece of all these works.
What are social network effects? Very simply defined, social network
effects exist if people prefer to do what other people already do. One reason for
this behavior is that what other people do is viewed as an information signal. A
person could believe that if someone else does a certain activity, this someone
else may have additional information about this activity. For example, if a
restaurant is crowded, people think is must be a good place to eat. Fashion or
peer pressure are different interpretations of network effects.
If a person prefers to walk, bicycle or use public transit as long he or
she sees other people using the same mode, then the concept of social network
effects also applies to transportation mode choice. In the transportation context,
social network effects can arise due to an externality, where the central issue
becomes a coordination problem. For example, while all members of a group
together would benefit by riding transit, if nobody is willing to take the first
step in using it the pay-off goes uncollected.
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Until recently nobody had applied these ideas towards transportation
mode choice modeling. Transportation planners were always aware of social
network effects. They knew that pedestrians like busy sidewalks, or people
prefer biking when they see other bicyclists. Even more, they understood that if
a transit system loses enough riders, it may easily collapse. The lack of these
demand-side network research in the area of transportation is especially
astonishing because supply-side network externalities, such as congestions,
were one of the major issues transportation science dealt with during the last
half century.
In the last few years, mainly two groups of authors, Antonio Páez and
Darren Scott at McMaster University in Canada, as well as Joan Walker at
Boston University and Elenna Dugundji at the University of Amsterdam in the
Netherlands, have worked on very similar questions. All of them developed
approaches to integrate demand-side network effects into their empirical travel
behavior models.
However, my dissertation differs from the above research in three
significant ways: First, I have developed a theoretical framework to evaluate
social network effects as an externality problem and discuss their
consequences. I found that social network effects in transportation mode choice
modeling can lead to multiple equilibria of this transportation mode, and,
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therefore, this transportation mode share would be path-dependent. The policy
implications are far-reaching, since modal split, such as walking in American
cities, results from potentially irreversible historical events.
Second, I model empirically the social network effects as a spatial
autoregressive process, rather than using a simple zonal mode share mean. My
approach of a spatially weighted modal split moving average is not only more
realistic, it also takes care of the endogeneity problem of the network variable.
Spatial data, however, is not always available. In these cases I find an
instrument for the social network effects.
Third, my research has a strong focus on policy matters. My major
contribution lies in making the transportation planning community aware of the
consequences of social network effects. Since ignoring network externalities
may lead to ill-informed decision making, I conclude all three essays with a
policy discussion that focuses on the relevance of my findings.
The dissertation comprises three essays, presented in Chapters 2, 3, and
4. In the next chapter, I lay out a theoretical framework for mode choice
decision making that includes social network effects. Starting off with an
analytical model, I find that social network effects may lead to multiple mode
share equilibria causing path-dependency. This means that a city’s actual
modal split (of e.g. pedestrians, bicyclists or transit riders) may follow unique
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historical events, and may be irreversible. A discussion of the welfare
implications shows that only the equilibrium with the highest level of the mode
share is welfare maximizing.
After generalizing the one-mode model to a two-mode model, I extend
the basic model to include congestion either on the mode exposed to social
network effects, or the alternate mode. I find that, for congestion on the
network-exposed mode, a congestion charge is not necessarily welfare
maximizing. Furthermore, if the alternate mode (e.g. automobile) is congested,
the externality of the network-exposed mode (e.g. transit) could be easier to
overcome. The results shed new light on the post-World War II transit
ridership collapse in the United States.
Based on the New York City household travel dataset, I then develop in
Chapter 3 a mode choice model to evaluate the presence of social network
effects in public transit use. Social network effects are modeled as a spatially
autoregressive transit mode share process. The regression coefficient estimates
for the social network effects variable were positive and significantly different
from zero at the 5-percent level. I also show that, if the mode choice model
does not account for social network effects, the estimates of the regression
coefficients exhibit an omitted variable bias. The consequences discussed in
the conclusion of the chapter are the following: Transit ridership is
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overestimated for trips going from the suburbs into the CBD, while it is
underestimated for trips within the central city. This systematic bias in the
model can become the cause for poor decision making by transportation
planners.
Finally, in Chapter 4 I analyze following the concept of social network
effects, municipal bicycle mode share differences in German cities. The new
idea is that a person’s decision to ride the bike depends also on the biking
city’s culture in which he or she lives. Using a national travel behavior dataset,
I build a binary logistic regression model to model bicycle mode choice as a
function of personal, trip and city-specific variables, plus social network
effects.
I employed a city-level instrumental variable, based on the bike mode
share of some excluded records (by trip purpose), and found that the regression
coefficient estimates were positive in all cases, as well as significantly different
from zero at the 5-percent level. The impact of two different bicycle
infrastructure proxies was found to be positive, as well. With this empirical
evidence of bicycle mode choice decision making depending on social network
effects, transportation planners may focus not only on infrastructure
improvements, but also on strengthening the city’s biking culture.

6

In Chapter 5, I finish up with a brief conclusion, summarizing all the
results and giving an outlook onto further research in the field of network
effects in transportation mode choice modeling.
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Chapter 2
Mode Choice and Social Networks:
The Economics of Walking, Bicycling and Public Transit Use

8

INTRODUCTION
Ever since the publication of Studies in the Economics of
Transportation (Beckmann, McGuire and Winston, 1956), network analysis in
transportation economics has centered on congestion as a negative externality.
The foundation of this research is the limited capacity of the physical
transportation network. 1 This paper builds upon and extends this approach by
also examining the positive network externalities stemming from the social
networks of people choosing certain transportation modes, namely walking,
bicycling and public transit. While traditional analysis is based on network
effects in the supply of transportation, my focus is on network effects in
transportation demand. The idea behind this new concept is simple: For some
transportation modes, such as walking, bicycling, or transit use, the
willingness-to-pay for people considering this mode increases with the number
of other people already taking the same mode. This seems counterintuitive in
the context of capacity constraints for transportation networks, since
traditionally an additional person on the same network link is thought as
imposing a congestion externality on everyone else already using the link.
While it is possible to include capacity constraints and congestion in my
argument, I did so only in the very last section of this paper, because for

1

For a survey on network analysis in transportation and beyond see Nagurney (2003).
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walking, bicycling and public transit the maximum capacity is typically very
high and rarely reached – a large city, such as New York, may be an exception.
Why do people prefer to walk, bike, or use public transit together with
others? The motivations can be grouped into three categories: The first
category is a utility gain through the network effects coming from some kind of
complementarity, since people are not alone, can meet other people,
communicate with them, and feel safer. The second category is based on
conformity and can be described as avoiding a utility loss by not following
others because of the social norm, peer pressure and/or fashion. And in the last
category, the utility improvement stems from internalizing an information
externality, because people using a certain transportation mode (i.e. public
transit) send a signal to everyone else that this is a feasible mode (public transit
is reliable and, therefore, works) 2 .
Including these social networks in mode choice decision-making is just
an additional aspect of current network analysis in transportation. I am not
claiming that these effects are more or less important than congestion.
However, this minor extension of accounting for positive network effects, even
if not given much weight, alters the result rather significantly.

2

This is similar to choosing a restaurant because its popularity is interpreted as a sign of
quality.
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Traditional economic reasoning assumes a downward sloping aggregate
transportation demand curve; however, I will show that, if network effects exist
in the mode choice decision, the demand curve changes to an inverted u-shape.
This fact leads to the possibility of multiple equilibria, which has far-reaching
consequences. First, a critical mass of users is necessary to make a
transportation mode feasible or a transportation facility utilized. Second, this
critical mass requirement may lead to local clusters of a specific transportation
mode, which means mode choice decisions become spatially autoregressive.
And third, potential multiple equilibria would make the actual mode share
outcome path-dependent and, thus, a result of unique historical events. All
three consequences are observable in real mode choices decisions, such as
walking, bicycling, and transit use, and have important policy implications to
be discussed in the conclusion.
While these insights are commonly known in the economics of network
industries (Economides, 1996; Rohlfs, 1974; Shy, 2001), they have not been
appropriately applied in the context of transportation networks. Yevdokimov
(2001 and 2002) incorporated demand-side network effects in his general
equilibrium model of optimal highway investment, but he did not theoretically
justify its use or further develop the concept. Goodwin et. al. (2005) mention
demand-side network effects for transit users in their microeconomics textbook
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without further developing the argument. Also, there is an emerging literature
that finds econometric evidence of demand-side network effects in mode
choice decision making (Dungundij and Walker, 2006; Goetzke, 2006), or
simulates network effects in travel behavior (Páez and Scott, 2005; 2006). This
literature, however, does not discuss the phenomena using an analytical model
derived from economic theory as presented in this paper. Of course, there is
also a body of economics literature concerning herd behavior (Banerjee, 1992),
as well as social interaction (Akerlof, 1997), elaborating on externalities and
multiple equilibria, but they do not explicitly deal with transportation mode
choice decision-making.
In the next section, I will introduce the basic mode choice model,
consisting of one transportation mode. Then, I will relax some of the
restrictions for the one-mode model and develop a general form of the basic
model, which will be used for the social welfare discussion in the following
section. In the next section, the model will be extended to two modes, before
finally congestion is added to the model. I finish with a conclusion.

THE BASIC MODEL
Loosely following the pioneering paper by Rohlfs (1974), where he
analyzes the demand structure of telecommunication services in the presence of
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network externalities, I will present a static partial equilibrium model, where
the marginal cost of using the transportation mode is exogenously determined.
The basic model includes positive network externalities, but not congestion (a
negative network externality) and allows a person to either use a certain
transportation mode for the trip or not do the trip at all. The assumption is that
all people are homogeneous in every aspect, except for their preference for
choosing the mode together with others and they all face the same marginal
cost using this mode.
Before delving too deeply into the theoretical aggregate model, I want
to first discuss graphically the impact of a positive network effect on the
demand curve of an individual person choosing to walk. As seen in Figure
2.1(a), the downward-sloping walking demand curve shifts up with a higher
pedestrian mode share, which means that at the same level of walking
consumption, the willingness-to-pay (WTP) for walking increases. Figure
2.1(b) exhibits the resulting upward sloping curve of WTP for one walking trip
with respect to pedestrian mode share, which is a good starting point for
introducing the basic model.

Figure 2.1 about here
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Consider now a group of n people choosing to undertake a nonessential trip where the only possible transportation mode is walking 3 .
Assuming a mode preference for walking with others of mx ≥ 0 4 , the utility Ux
for a specific person x taking this walking trip is defined as follows:
mx se – p

if the person walks and

Ux =

(1)
0

if the person does not walk.

The first term in Equation (1), which is the product of the personal mode
preference for walking with others, mx, and the expected pedestrian mode share
se ≥ 0, represents the network effect. The second part of the equation, p ≥ 0,
denotes the full cost of walking. Since a low preference to use the modes with
others, mx, will result in a value closer to zero, it can be easily seen that this
leads to the cost of walking becoming more dominant when compared to the
network effect. However, as the mode preference grows stronger, the walking
cost term will lose its relative importance.
Now I can analyze a specific person x’ who is indifferent about walking
or not walking. This would be the case as long as:
mx’ se – p = 0

3

The assumption of a single transportation mode, such as walking, simplifies the analysis for
better understanding. A later extension of the model will add more realism by allowing an
alternative mode.
4
If mx < 0, then the person dislikes walking with others, which would be a congestion case.

14

p = mx’ se

(2)

Equation (2) resembles exactly the network effect for an individual person as
seen in Figure 2.1(b). The larger the preference to use the mode with others,
mx’, the steeper the slope of the WTP curve in the graph and the more
pronounced the network effect. A walking preference of zero would cause a
horizontal WTP curve and a walking preference of infinity, a vertical WTP
curve.
In order to derive the aggregate demand curve, I first need to determine
the distribution for the preference to use the mode with others, mx, over all n
people. The simplest case would be a uniform distribution for mx, which is
defined as a linear equation, where person x is mapped to the preference for
using the mode with others, mx, as follows:
mx = M –

M

/n x

(3)

M is the maximum value for mx and n is the number of people potentially
walking. In this set-up, the first person on the left of the x-axis has the highest
preference to walk with others, while the last person on the right side of the xaxis has the lowest preference to walk with others (Figure 2.2).

Figure 2.2 about here
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In order to derive the aggregate demand curve, I have to use Equation
(3) for a specific person x’ in Equation (2):
p = mx’ se
p = (M –

M

/n x’) se

(4)

In Equation (4), I know that while person x’ is indifferent towards walking, all
people indexed as x < x’ become definitely pedestrians, since their preference
for walking with others is higher than for person x’. Therefore, assuming
perfect foresight, I can simply say that the expected pedestrian mode share is
equal to the number of actual pedestrians:
se = 1/n x’

(5)

The inverse aggregate demand function for walking can now be derived by
substituting Equation (5) into Equation (4). I also want to normalize x’ to the
pedestrian share s = x/n :

p = (M – M/n x’) 1/n x’
p = (s – s2) M

(6)

The aggregate demand curve, as seen in Figure 2.3, has an inverted ushape, is upward sloping at low levels of walking and becomes downward
sloping after reaching the maximum WTP of ¼M at a pedestrian mode share of
1

/2. This means that as long as the mode share is less than 1/2 the WTP for
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walking increases with every additional pedestrian, which is a result of the
positive network externality. Assuming constant returns to scale, a horizontal
marginal cost curve can be added to Figure 2.3. The level of the marginal cost
curve (MC) will be determined by travel time, the quality of the walking
facilities (the higher the quality, the lower the cost), and other factors of
convenience, such as weather and/or aesthetics.

Figure 2.3 about here

As long the marginal cost is above the maximum WTP (MC > ¼M),
such as in the example of p1, the mode share will be zero (s1), as seen in point
A in Figure 2.3. However, if the marginal cost drops below ¼M, p2 will
intersect three times with the demand curve, leading to two stable outcomes (B
and D), as well as to one unstable outcome (C) according to the phase diagram.
With outcome B, there are still no pedestrians, but if outcome D is achieved,
the mode share for walking will be s2. The existence of two stable equilibria
can result in two similar walking facilities with the same marginal cost, while
facing the same aggregate demand curve can potentially have two different
levels of utilization, one at zero and the other significantly above.
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THE GENERAL FORM OF THE BASIC MODEL
The basic model above has quite a few restrictions that I want to relax
now. The major restriction is the uniformly distributed network preference. The
question is whether or not the inverted u-shape of the aggregate demand curve
holds also for skewed mode preference distributions. To discuss the cases of a
larger number of people having a high or low preference for walking with
others, I can formulate the following general equation for the network
preference distribution:
mx = [1 – ( x/n)a] M, with a≥ 0

(7)

The basic model discussed in the section above exists for a =1. If a > 1,
however, then there are more people with high preferences to walk with others,
while as long as 0 < a < 1, there are more people with low preferences to walk
with others. Substituting Equation (7) into Equation (2) and normalizing for
pedestrian share using Equation (5), I can find the following aggregate demand
function:
p = (s – sa+1) M

(8)

The characteristic of an inverted u-shape does not change with this addition,
but the peak moves to the right of the center (pedestrian share equals ½) for a
> 1, and to the left for 0 < a < 1. If a = 0, which identifies the case where
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everybody has the same preference to walk with others at M, the inverted ushaped aggregate demand curve flattens to a horizontal line at the level of M.
So far, I have assumed that people are not willing to pay for walking
independently of the positive network effect. If I relax this assumption, another
term, bx ≥ 0, can be added to Equation (1), which could be seen as a parameter
of a personal preference for walking. If aggregated, the functional form of b(x)
depends on the distribution of bx over all potential pedestrians, which, in this
context, I do not need to restrict with any assumptions. Therefore, the general
form of the aggregate demand curve is now:
p = (s – sa+1) M + b(x)

(9)

What the minimum WTP for walking independent of others, bx, does, is
shifting the individual WTP curve up by its value with respect to pedestrian
mode share. Now it is possible to derive the traditionally downward sloping
aggregate demand curve by assuming that all people have the same preference
of walking with others of 0, but they also have a decreasing WTP, which is
independent of others as well as uniformly distributed between B and 0. This
would result in the aggregate demand curve starting on the left at the value of B
for a pedestrian share of 0 and ending on the right at the value of 0 for a
pedestrian share of 1. By combining different preferences for walking with
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others, mx, and different WTP for walking independent of others, bx, I can
derive the aggregate demand curve seen in Figure 2.4.

Figure 2.4 about here

Figure 2.4 shows the individual demand curves with respect to the
pedestrian mode share based on their individual combinations of network and
personal walking preferences: The first person on the far left has a personal
walking preference of B3, but does not care about walking with others (no
network effects). Moving from left to right, the next person has a personal
walking preference of B2 and a network preference equal to the slope of her
individual demand curve. The following person has the same personal walking
preference as the person before, but, again, her network preference is equal to
0. The next person (in the middle) has a personal preference of 0, but now the
network preference is the same as the one of the second person (same slope of
the demand curve). The next person has again the same personal walking
preference of 0, but a lower network preference than the previous person
(lower slope). Finally, the two following people have both the same network
preferences (parallel demand curves), however, the very last person, on the far
right, has a personal walking preference of 0, while the person before has a
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personal walking preference of B1. If all the individual demand curves are
combined, an aggregate demand curve can be derived, such as exhibited in
Figure 2.4. With increasing pedestrian mode share, which means moving in the
graph from left to right, the highest WTP value is selected for each level of
pedestrian mode share, to derive the aggregate demand curve.
Finally, I have to relax the assumption of mx being a real number. As
long as I have people who always walk independent of others, I have to allow
mx to become infinity. The result would be a vertical, inelastic aggregate
demand curve. In Figure 2.5, I have combined all possible cases (discussed
above) into a more realistic aggregate demand curve. On the far left I start with
a share of s1 people having a preference value of walking with others of
infinity, then, still on the left, I continue with a group having high values of mx,
where the change of the minimum WTP, bx, is more dominant than the network
effect (until s2), followed by a group to the right, where the network effect
dominates the change of b (s3), and finish on the far right with a group of
people having a preference to walk with others of 0 and a decreasing value of
bx.

Figure 2.5 about here
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SOCIAL WELFARE DISCUSSION
In order to be able to decide which of the two stable equilibria is
welfare maximizing, I have to evaluate Equation (4) and (8) assuming that the
expected pedestrian mode share is the actual pedestrian mode share s*. Since
all pedestrians with a larger value for their preference to use the mode with
others (on the left of s*) also have a higher WTP then the actual cost at s*,
there will be a consumer surplus. In order to derive the consumer surplus, I
need to find the aggregate demand curve at the fixed level of se = s*. To
simplify the exercise, I assume that b(x) is equal to 0:
p = (M – M sa) se
p = M s* – (M s*) sa

(10)

As seen in Figure 2.5, the aggregate demand curve at the actual level of
pedestrian share s* is classically downward sloping and intersects with the
inverted u-shaped aggregate demand curve at the point s* = s1. In the graph I
assume that the walking preference parameter bx is the same for everyone at a
level of B.
Using Equation (10), the consumer surplus for the stable right-hand,
non-zero equilibrium outcome at s* can be estimated as follows:
CS = 0∫s* [M s* – (M s*) sa] ds
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= ½ M S* – (1/a+1) M (s*)a+2 + k
= M s*2 (½ – 1/a+1 s*a) + k ≥ 0 for ½ ≤ s* ≤ 1 and a ≥ 1

(11)

The constant of integration is k. Assuming that there is no producer surplus, the
right-hand stable equilibrium with a pedestrian mode share of s1 ≥ ½ (point B)
must be the welfare maximizing outcome (CS ≥ 0), because the consumer
surplus will be always greater then for a pedestrian share of 0 (point A), where
the consumer surplus is just zero.

Figure 2.6 about here

However, the actual mode share outcome is path-dependent. Therefore
the welfare maximizing result is not guaranteed. This can typically be seen in
new pedestrian infrastructure investments, which indeed decrease the marginal
cost of walking without necessarily increasing its usage. In order to take
advantage of the positive network effects, a subsidy may be needed, at least in
theory, ideally paid to the people with the highest preference to walk with
others. Then the zero-equilibrium will move towards the welfare maximizing
equilibrium. In practice, this subsidy could be an informational advertisement
campaign or consist of other kinds of promotions for the new infrastructure,
such as group walks, which first convinces people with a large value for their
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preference to walk with others to use the new infrastructure. Then other
pedestrians should follow as soon as the critical mass is passed. 5 In the context
of transit, a monthly pass may also make the people with the highest network
preference willing to start using the bus, with the result that others may follow.
In summary, it can be said, since the inverted u-shaped aggregate
demand curve exhibits positive network effects causing changing WTP curves
for each pedestrian mode share level, that the area underneath the demand
curve is not equal to the consumer surplus.

THE TWO-MODE MODEL
Most transportation mode choice decisions involve at least two
alternatives, such as public transit and the automobile. This extended model
will therefore account for two modes, one with positive network externalities
(public transit) and one without any network externalities. The change is
conceptually easy to include into the general form of the basic model. All
previous assumptions remain, except now everyone has to undertake the trip
with one of both transportation modes. Therefore, nobody can choose to not
take the trip at all:

5

To refer back to the previously mentioned restaurant example, the first few customers receive
a free meal or discount, is a typical approach use by restaurants to take advantage of the
positive network effects.
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mx se – p + bx

if the person uses transit and

Ux =

(12)
– c + dx

if the person takes the car

In Equation (12), p ≥ 0 is the full cost for using transit, which is the fare, but
could also include the travel time as well as the mode’s disamenities. The full
cost of driving a car (operation, parking and travel time) is represented by c,
while dx ≥ 0 is the individual WTP for driving the car, again a parameter of
personal preference for driving 6 . After manipulating Equation (12), not
assuming a functional form for the distribution of dx, it can be shown that the
aggregate demand curve just shifts upwards by the amount of the automobile
cost [c – d(x)], while all previously discussed characteristics remain, including
the potential for multiple equilibria:
p = (s – sa+1) M + b(s) + [c – d(x)]

(13)

As soon as the cost of the alternative mode to transit, automobile cost,
c, decreases, the inverted u-shaped aggregate demand curve shifts down as
expected with the result of a lower transit share. This means, because of the
inverted u-shape characteristics of the aggregate demand curve that transit
could lose its critical mass of users. Transit mode share would collapse from s1
to s2 with the decrease of the automobile operating cost from d1 to d2 (see

In the context of the individual WTP curve p = mx se + bx + c – dx, the term (bx – dx) becomes
the personal preference for walking relative to driving.
6
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Figure 2.7). Therefore, positive network effects may provide a good
explanation for what has happened to the public transit mode share between the
end of World War II, 1945, and the first Oil Crisis, 1975. During this time
transit ridership declined in the United States at a very rapid rate as a result of
increased access to cars and lower automobile operation costs (APTA, 1995;
Clair, 1981). When using my explaination, however, I do not have to assume a
change in the preferences towards either public transit or the automobile,
represented in the WTP b(s) and d(s), respectively. Nor do I even have to
assume a lower quality of transit service, which would result in an upward shift
of the marginal cost curve, p, as is common in the conspiracy theories
surrounding this issue (Slater, 1997). Both an additional change of individual
preferences away from public transportation and towards the car, as well as a
lower transit service quality, would further accelerate the described process.

Figure 2.7 about here

ADDING CONGESTION TO THE MODEL
At last, I want to add congestion to the models discussed above. There
are two possible cases to consider: The first case is where marginal social cost
for the transportation mode exhibiting positive network effects is greater than
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its marginal private cost. The question in this context is if a congestion toll
equal to the externality is efficient as is the case without the network effects. In
the second case, I want to discuss consequences in the aggregate demand curve
when the alternative mode is congested.
Using the basic model in its general form, I now assume that the
walking facility can get congested, which means that with a higher pedestrian
share it is slower to walk because of crowding. Assuming that the congestion
cost is equal for everyone, I can subtract a congestion term f(s) from Equation
(8), which is a positive function of the pedestrian share. After again
manipulating the equation as previously done, the following aggregate demand
function can be found:
p = (s – sa+1) M + bx – f(s)

(14)

In equation (14) the WTP for walking falls at the rate of increasing congestion
cost, with the result that the inverted u-shaped aggregate demand curve pivots
around the origin down to the left and gets compressed to scale. As seen in
Figure 2.8, this leads to a flatter inverted u-shape of the aggregate demand
curve, as well as one which intersects with the x-axis before the pedestrian
share reaches the value of one. Since the supply curve representing the cost of
walking did stay the same, the change could lead to a zero mode share
equilibrium because the WTP for walking is at all points less than the cost.
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Figure 2.8 about here

So far the analysis has only taken into account that an additional
pedestrian faces a higher cost of walking. However, to complete the picture,
this pedestrian also imposes a congestion externality on all already existing
pedestrians. The traditional approach for internalizing this congestion cost on
others is to charge a toll in the amount of this congestion externality. But with
positive network effects, there may be cases where a congestion toll may not be
welfare maximizing. To see that, consider again Equation (14). A congestion
toll of t(s) would further decrease the willingness to pay (the inverted u-shape
becomes even more flat) with the possible consequence of moving a stable
right-hand equilibrium with a positive pedestrian share to a zero equilibrium. If
that happens, it can be stated that as long as the consumer surplus of the
equilibrium without the congestion toll minus the total external cost from the
congestion is greater than zero, not charging a congestion toll is welfare
maximizing, since the alternative is a consumer surplus of zero.
It is possible that a congestion toll may not be welfare maximizing even
if the congestion toll does not lead to a zero mode share equilibrium, because
the aggregate demand curve at a fixed level of pedestrian share is changing
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with the actual pedestrian share (see again Figure 2.6). Therefore, it can happen
that the consumer surplus of the equilibrium without the congestion toll minus
the total cost from the congestion is still greater than the consumer surplus of
the equilibrium with congestion cost. This result stems from the fact that the
positive network effect is an external benefit, counteracting the effect coming
from the congestion externality.
In summary, it can be said that as long as the externality caused by the
positive network effect cannot be internalized, as it would be typically the case
in the real, second-best world, a congestion toll can turn out to be economically
inefficient. Since the finding also holds for the two-mode model, it is especially
important to stress in the context of congested transit systems that instituting a
congestion-based fare system could lead to suboptimal outcomes.
Now I want to evaluate congestion cost occurring in the alternative
mode of a two-mode model. Using transit as the mode with positive network
effects and the automobile as the alternative transportation mode, a negative
congestion term, g(1 – s), which is a positive function of how many do not use
transit (1 – s), needs to be added to the automobile cost, so that Equation (13)
changes as follows:
p = (s – sa+1) M + [b(s) – d(s)] + [c + g(1 – s)]
= (s – sa+1) M + [b(s) – d(s)] + [c – g(s)]
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(15)

Interpreting Equation (15), in Figure 2.9 it can be seen that the congestion term
pivots the aggregate transit demand curve up to the right around the point
where the transit share is 1, and, therefore, increases the WTP for transit at the
amount of the automobile congestion cost. The result is that the inverted
u-shaped aggregate transit demand curve is lifted up on the left, essentially
decreasing the positive network characteristics. In cities with high congestion
costs, this again can lead to a purely downwardly sloped aggregate demand
curve for transit, which coincides with the empirically observed facts of large,
congested cities with a functioning transit system. This also explains why
automobile congestion prevents the collapse of transit use as previously
described.
Furthermore, if a congestion toll would be charged for the automobile
mode, equal to the external cost an additional driver imposes on all the other
already existing drivers, then this congestion toll would further lift the
aggregate transit demand curve up on the left, and would cause an increased
WTP for transit at low transit share levels. Thus, a congestion toll would not
only, increase transit ridership as expected, but may prevent transit systems
close to collapse from doing so.
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POLICY CONCLUSION
Transportation planners always knew about the existence of network
effects for the walking, bicycling and transit modes. However, nobody
formalized the theory as I have done, so that it becomes possible to derive clear
and unambiguous policy recommendations.
Since the aggregate demand curve derived for transportation modes
exhibiting positive network effects has an u-shape which can lead to multiple
equilibria, there are two major conclusions to draw from this research: On the
one hand, transportation modes such as walking, biking and/or transit require a
critical mass because of the u-shaped demand curve. On the other hand, the
actual mode share outcome is path-dependent and historically determined
because of the existence of multiple equilibria.
Despite the historic uniqueness of actual local transportation mode
share equilibrium, I also expect that the actual mode share outcomes are locally
clustered, because of the spill-over characteristics of networks, and therefore
spatially correlated. The result would be pockets of very high walking or transit
use in a certain city, while other areas of the same city have extremely low
shares of these transportation modes. This is exactly what can be observed in
large cities, such as New York, where it can be found that in parts of
Manhattan the pedestrian mode share for walking trips is almost half, while
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other neighborhoods have a transit mode share well above 50%. As
econometrically shown in Goetzke (2006), this phenomenon cannot
exclusively be explained by travel time, but also needs to be informed by the
theory of positive network effects.
Goetzke (2006) further finds that if mode choice decisions are spatially
autoregressive, a systematic bias in traffic forecasting will be introduced into
the mode choice model, severely impacting the foundation of policy decision
making in the context of new infrastructure investment.
Additional policy-relevant findings are as follows: It is not enough to
just build new and better infrastructure with the intent of raising the mode
share for this transportation mode. As long as the current mode share is at the
zero equilibrium it takes more to convince people to use new and better
facilities, which can be seen with new pedestrian, biking and/or transit facilities
in areas with virtually no pedestrians, bikers or transit users.
Therefore, it is crucial for cities with a still functioning transit system to
prevent transit ridership to drop below the critical mass. Improving automobile
traffic may eventually lead to an irreversible collapse of transit with the
consequence that drivers are also worse off. In this context it is important to
mention that in a city the more people who depend on transit as their sole mode
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of transportation, the more likely it is, that a person who owns an automobile
will use transit, as well, because of network effects.
Finally, promoting walking, biking and/or transit use and improving
information about these transportation modes may make it possible that the
mode share moves from the zero equilibrium to a right-hand equilibrium, since
marketing and advertisement campaigns function as a subsidy, essentially
internalizing the external network benefit.
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Figure 2.1: Positive network effects for an individual person in their mode choice
decision.
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(a) With higher mode share increases the
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shifts up (positive network effect).
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(b) Because of the network effect, the curve of
WTP for one walking trip w.r.t. to pedestrian
mode share is an upward sloping curve.

Figure 2.2: Linear distribution of the preference for walking with others mx over the
group of all n potential pedestrians.
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Figure 2.3: Phase diagram for the u-shaped aggregate walking demand curve with
network effects.
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Figure 2.4: Aggregate walking demand curve for a combination of per person
different preference for walking with others as well as for different WTP for
walking independent of others.
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Figure 2.5: A realistic example of all combination of preference to walk with others,
M, and minimum WTP for walking, b (explanation see text).
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Figure 2.6: Welfare analysis for walking demand with positive network effects,
assuming a constant bx.
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Figure 2.7: The collapse of transit use from s1 to s2 after automobile cost drops from
c1 to c2 (example for the United Stated between 1945 and 1975).
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Figure 2.8: The u-shaped aggregate demand curve for walking pivots around the
origin as soon the marginal congestion cost is included and decreases the willingness
to pay.
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Figure 2.9: With congestion on the alternative mode, the aggregate demand curve
pivots around the point of a transit share 1. This can result into a traditionally
downward sloped demand curve.
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Chapter 3
Social Network Effects in Public Transit Use:
Evidence from a Spatially Autoregressive Mode Choice Model
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INTRODUCTION
In this paper, I empirically test for positive network effects in transit
use by applying a spatial autoregressive logit mode choice model with 1997/98
work trip data from New York City. Positive network effects exist when people
prefer to use transit together with other people as a result of social spill-over.
Although these network preferences should differ for each person, because of
statistical restrictions in the model, I cannot get individual network
preferences. However, I will be able to econometrically derive a measure of
their aggregate network preference.
There is increasing interest in analyzing spatial dependencies and
network effects in travel behavior. LeSage and Polasek (2005) examine
commodity flow matrices by extending a gravity model, a tool widely used in
the field of transportation, to include spatial autocorrelation. Using a Monte
Carlo simulation, Páez and Scott (2005; 2006), investigate in two forthcoming
articles the impact of social networks in discrete choice models.
It is not entirely new to include network effects into empirical choice
models. Brock and Durlauf have been researching methods to account for
social interaction and neighborhood effects in both binary, as well as
multinomial choice models (Brock and Durlauf, 2001; 2002). However, they
do not explicitly include a spatial dimension to the discussion of the problem.
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On the other hand, very few spatial discrete choice models have been estimated
because of its computational complexity, none of them deal with social
interaction and spatial spill-over effects in disaggregate transportation behavior
(Anselin, 1988; Fleming, 2004).
While there exists a spatially autoregressive mode choice model using
aggregate data (Boldoc et al., 1995), a spatially autoregressive disaggregate
mode choice model based on real-world, empirical data to examine network
effects has never been done.
In the next section, I will lay out the theory of how to econometrically
model network effects, followed by an overview of the data used and the issues
surrounding the design of the weight matrix. Then, I develop the actual
econometric models and evaluate the result before finishing with a discussion
of the consequences for policy makers.

THEORY OF MODELING NETWORK EFFECTS
In Goetzke (2006) the theory of network effects is introduced as it
applies to transportation mode choice decision making. Interpreting network
effects as a signal that a certain transportation mode is safe and reliable 7 , the
main claim of the paper is that the utility of taking this mode increases with its

7

Just like a full restaurant is a sign for good food and satisfied customers.
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mode share. Therefore, the more people use the mode, the more attractive this
transportation mode becomes for all other people. These social spill-over
effects lead to positive demand-side network externalities, the exact opposite
from what is known as congestion. 8
However, Goetzke did not provide any empirical evidence that these
network effects exist. In this paper, I develop a rigorous econometric
framework to examine real-world data and quantify these network effects. The
starting point for the analysis is the random utility conditional mode choice
model, the traditionally used workhorse of transportation demand modeling
and forecasting (McFadden, 1974; Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985; Train, 2003).
Because of the structure of the spatial weight matrix used in the model, I will
restrict the analysis in this paper to a binary mode choice model. However, the
general approach can be extended to a multinomial mode choice model, as
discussed in the conclusion.
Let’s consider the utility vni of N individuals with n = 1, …, N using
mode i, which is a function of A personal characteristics, xan, with a = 1, …, A,
and the B mode-specific characteristics, tbi, with b = 1, …, B. Assuming that
vni is a linear combination of xan, tbi, as well as a random error term εni

8

While it is in this context possible to also analyze negative congestion externality, it is not the
focus of this study.
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(stemming from unobserved utility determinants), an empirical utility model
could be expressed as follows:

vni = α1 x1n + …+ αa xan + β1 t1i + … + βb tbi + εni = xn α + ti β + εni

(1)

where xn is a 1 x A vector of personal characteristics, ti is a 1 x B vector of
mode characteristics, and α and β are the corresponding column vectors of
regression parameters.
However, data can only be collected on transportation mode choice
decisions, not on mode-specific utility levels. Therefore, Equation (1) has to be
transformed in such a way that vin becomes an unobserved, latent variable.
Assuming that εni is logistically distributed, a binary logit mode choice model
can be derived, with Pn(i) being the probability of person n to choose mode i
over mode j:

Pni = P (vni ≥ vnj)
= (exp vni)/(exp vni + exp vnj)
= 1/[1 + exp –(vni – vnj)]

(2)
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If the above random utility model is extended to account for network
effects, it is necessary to add a spatially autogressive mode-choice term to
Equation (1). Therefore, the model includes a spatial weight matrix, W, of the
dimension N x N, as well as an N x 1 vector mi of revealed mode choice
decisions by people. Both terms together, (Wmi), result in the spatially
weighted average mode share of mode i for all the neighboring people of
individual n. The scalar ρ is the regression coefficient for the spatial lag term:

vni = xn α + ti β + (W mi) ρ + εni

(3)

The spatially autoregressive structure becomes more visible when
considering that mi is actually a function of the N x 1 mode-specific utility
vector vi for all individual n. If the mode choice model is now written down in
its full matrix form, then the issue of spatial autoregression can be easily seen:

P (mi = 1) = 1/[1 + exp –(vi – vj)]
= F[x α, ( ti≠1 – ti=1) β, (W mi) ρ]

(4)

Assuming that the error term does not exhibit any spatial
autocorrelation, Equation (4) represents now what Anselin (2002) calls a
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conditional spatially autoregressive discrete choice model. The estimation of
this model is straight forward, since a maximum likelihood approach can be
used. The model design is also very similar to the one proposed by Páez and
Scott (2006), except that the network effects are not based on social
interaction, but rather on spatial dependency.
The 1 x N vector of probabilities P to use mode i becomes a function of:
the N x A individual characteristics matrix x; the differences between the two
N x B mode-specific characteristics matrices ti≠1 and ti=1, which are related to
both available modes; the average mode share of all surrounding neighbors
(Wmi), representing network effects; and all the corresponding vectors of
regression coefficients α, β, as well as the regression coefficient scalar ρ.
Because of the spatial weight matrix referring to just one mode, in its basic
form this model can only be applied to binary choice models. I will discuss in
the conclusion an extension towards multinomial choice models.

Figure 3.1 about here

Equation (4) essentially says that, with increasing neighboring mode
share in mode i = 1, the probability of a person to also choose this
transportation mode increases as well. Therefore, a positive value of ρ, which

52

is significantly different from zero, indicates the existence of network effects.
Now, if the utility of using the mode is an indicator of the willingness to pay
(WTP) and assumed to be correlated with the WTP for the transportation
mode, the regression coefficient ρ can be interpreted as the value of the slope
for the upward-sloping WTP curve with respect to mode share, due to network
effects (see Figure 3.1). However, in reality it is expected that different people
have individual levels of ρ, which cannot be modeled as such, because the
number of variables, including all the personal network preferences would
surpass the available degrees of freedom. Therefore, the network effects
estimate ρ refers to the aggregate network effects.

DATA SET AND WEIGHT MATRIX
The data used for the spatially autoregressive logit mode choice model
is based on the 1997/1998 comprehensive regional household travel diary
survey conducted for the Best-Practice Travel Demand Forecasting Model by
the New York Metropolitan Transportation Council (NYMTC). New York City
seemed to be a very good choice for this analysis, because, while it is an
American city, it also has a large transit ridership. These two facts make the
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results easier transferable to both different American and other cities in the
world. 9
The data was collected for the whole metropolitan area of 28 counties,
which include parts of upstate New York, New Jersey and Connecticut, but I
only took data from the five New York City boroughs of the Bronx, Brooklyn,
Manhattan, Queens and Staten Island. The main reasons for choosing these
boroughs are:



The New York City area has a relatively high density of surveyed
households, allowing a meaningful weight matrix to be developed, which is
necessary for estimating the autoregressive model. Outside of the NYC
area, the distances between surveyed neighbors becomes rather large.



Only in New York City is the number of transit riders high enough to get
the variability in the data set desired for econometric analysis. Also, NYC
has an integrated transit system. Therefore, individuals there face roughly
the same transit infrastructure.

9

The fact that the data set is almost 10 years old should not have any impact on the results,
because of the general nature of this research.

54

For the mode choice model, only trips from home to work were used.
The literature in classical transportation modeling distinguishes between the
three typical trip purposes: Home-based work trips (HBW), non home-based
trips (NHB), and home-based other trips (HBO). Each trip purpose is modeled
differently, since the mode choice determinants are expected to differ. Purely
for practical reasons I decided to restrict my analysis only to HBW trips. I also
included only transit and drive-alone trips (more than 90% of all HBW trips)
between different travel analysis zones (TAZ) within New York City which
were longer than 1.5 miles or 2.4 km (to exclude the possibility of walking). In
the end I had 1,652 person trips from all five boroughs of New York City, of
which 32.7 percent drove alone to work and the remaining 67.3 percent used
transit.
Using U.S. census block group longitude and latitude information,
Figure 3.2 displays the location of the surveyed households used to create the
spatial weight matrix. As it can be seen in the map, the density of households is
much greater in Manhattan compared to the remaining four boroughs. This can
be contributed to the fact that the sample is not spatially random, since the
sampling was not done with a spatially autoregressive model in mind.

Figure 3.2 about here
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Accounting for the heterogeneous household location density, a rowstandardized spatial weight matrix of the dimension N x N was developed as
follows: Each row contains the 40 closest neighbors of the corresponding
observation n which are equally weighted. Adding more than 40 neighbors
would have not given significantly more information, since the average mode
share will not change much anymore. As soon as a neighbor lives further away
than 0.75 miles (1.2 km), however, he or she was not included, unless the
number of neighbors would drop below four. The weight matrix needs a
minimum number of neighbors in order to be meaningful. If a neighbor is
further away than 0.75 (1.2 km), or a 20 minute walk, the neighborhood
characteristics may change too much to reflect network effects. The sum of the
weights in each row adds up to one, so that the spatial weight matrix
effectively calculates the spatially moving transit mode split average.
This method of deriving a spatially moving transit mode split average
represents a unifying decision rule, while it also allows accounting for the
heterogeneity of the boroughs in terms of spatial household density. It turns out
that the average number of neighbors is 23, with the maximum number of 40
neighbors existing for about a quarter of the records. The average distance of
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neighbors is 0.4 miles (0.64 km) and very few of them, a little more than ½
percent, are further away than 0.75 (1.2 km).

MODEL AND RESULTS
The objective for developing the following model is to find out whether
or not network effects exist for transit use. The basic set-up is a McFaddentype mode choice model (McFadden, 1974) that includes the commonly used
determinants of mode choice decision making: total travel time, access to a car,
income, and gender. Age was not considered because of the large number of
missing observations. Mainly to control for parking cost in Manhattan, a
dummy was added as a proxi for all Manhattan destinations. Finally, the
network effects for transit use was measured as the spatially autoregressive
term of revealed mode choice decisions previously described, which essentially
is equivalent to the spatially weighted average transit mode share of all
neighbors. The model, however, accounts only for aggregate network effects.
The expected individual network effects cannot be captured econometrically,
due to the restricted number of degrees of freedom, as discussed above.
Three different models were evaluated. The first model, called the basic
model, omits network effects and represents the traditional approach of mode
choice modeling. In the following two models, network effects are included.
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The model with network effects incorporates a variable for the aggregate
network effects. In the model with network effects controlled for car access,
which was run to do sensitivity analysis, the network effects were split into an
aggregate component and a component for people not having access to a car.

Table 3.1 about here

The results of all three models are exhibited in Table 3.1. Standard
errors are shown in parentheses and statistical significance is indicated by stars.
All estimated regression coefficients of the basic model have the expected
signs. Except for the mode-specific constant and the high income group
variable, they are also significantly different from zero at the one-percent level.
While it is not a problem that the estimate of the regression coefficient for the
high income group variable is not significantly different from zero, it is
potentially a problem for the mode-specific constant term, since it is expected
that people prefer the automobile over transit.
The regression coefficient of the total travel time variable is negative
because the indirect utility derived from using any transportation mode
decreases with more time spent on it. In this context it should be emphasized
that the total travel time regression coefficient of the McFadden-type mode
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choice model is based on the difference of the mode-specific travel time, using
the transportation mode in the constant term as the point of reference.
Therefore, total travel time measures effectively how much it takes longer to
ride transit in comparison to the car.
Obviously, if a person does not have access to a car, he or she is more
likely to use transit. This explains the positive sign for the no-access-to-a-car
dummy coefficient estimate. Since parking is very costly in Manhattan, people
are more inclined to take transit there, which makes the regression coefficient
positive. The automobile is a normal good, therefore, the high income group
will avoid transit, resulting in a negative coefficient estimate. Finally, men are
less willing to ride transit, leading to a negative regression coefficient.
The model with network effects improves upon the mode-specific
constant (in comparison to the basic model), since the regression coefficient
estimate, while keeping its negative sign, becomes now significantly different
from zero. In addition, the new model reveals a positive aggregate network
effects for transit use, while all the other coefficient values remain very robust.
A negative network effects coefficient value would have been a sign of an
aggregate personal aversion towards transit crowding which is typically known
as congestion externality.
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It is interesting to interpret the constant term together with the network
effects: With very low transit mode share, the relative indirect utility of using
transit is smaller than for driving alone (see negative value of the constant). As
soon as the transit mode share moves towards one, the difference of indirect
utility between transit use and drive alone decreases until transit use utility
eventually surpasses indirect utility of driving alone, since the network effects
coefficient is larger than the coefficient for the constant. This is exactly what is
expected from network effects. The willingness to pay for transit, which is
related to the indirect utility, increases when more people take transit, and thus
lowers the relative cost of using transit (vs. the car).
In the model with network total travel time is the major variable
representing the supply side. For the transit mode, total travel time includes invehicle travel time, access and egress time, as well as wait time. For the drive
alone mode, total travel time is based on the automobile travel speed.
Therefore, total travel time is an aggregate variable of the physical
infrastructure, accounting for transit service level and highway congestion.
However, what if the network effects variable captures a portion of the
supply side? It can be seen in Table 3.1 that the coefficient estimates for total
travel time are essentially the same in the basic model and the model with
network effects. In the case of network effects incorporating the infrastructure,

60

it is expected that the values would be not as close as they are. It could also be
argued that the network effects variable accounts for some unmeasured supply
level. For example, a person without having access to a car may live closer to a
transit station and is more likely surrounded by people also without car access.
Thus, better transit availability could easily explain network effects.
The model with network effects controlling for car access addresses the
issue by splitting the network effects into two components: the aggregate
network effects and the network effects for people without access to a car. The
most important finding is that the inclusion of the second network effect
component does not greatly change the value of the regression coefficient for
aggregate network effects. Furthermore, the estimate of the network effects
regression coefficient for people without access to a car is not significantly
different from zero. If the network effects variable for people with no access to
a car is analyzed in conjunction with the no-access-to-a-car dummy, it can be
seen that the network effects coefficient absorbs part of the dummy coefficient.
The dummy coefficient estimate becomes less significant and decreases at
about the same value of the additional network effects regression coefficient
for people without access to a car, multiplied by the average transit mode
share. All other coefficient estimates remain stable in value and significance.
The attempt of the last model to control for potentially unobserved supply side
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effects that stem from the physical infrastructure did not yield any
improvements. The original model with network effects can be viewed as
robust.
It still may be possible that the network effects variable captures some
effects of the transit amenities such as transit safety, crime rates, station
cleanliness or infrastructure quality. Furthermore, using transit in high numbers
may even generate these amenities, when, for example, transit riders create a
less crime-ridden environment, or demand a cleaner transit station. This is
exactly what Goetzke (2006) discussed as the possible source of network
effects, when he views them as a signal for safe and reliable transit. Therefore,
unlike in the typical mode choice model, all these formerly omitted transit
characteristics can now conveniently be seen as summarized in the network
effects variable. In this context, the network effects variable gives way to a
nice interpretation: It essentially becomes an indication of people’s perception
how well transit works.
Now it can be concluded that in the presence of network effects, the
individual mode choice decision making does not only depend on personal
traits and mode-specific characteristics, but also on the mode share of the
person’s neighborhood. This means, everything else being equal, and counter
to conventional wisdom, that poor people are less likely to use transit in areas
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with low transit share than in areas with high transit share. On the other hand,
more wealthy people take transit in areas with high transit share compared to
areas with low transit share.

POLICY CONSEQUENCES
The fact that transit use exhibits network effects may lead to farreaching policy consequences. It is typical for both transportation planners as
well as policy decision makers to depend on travel demand forecasting models
for evaluating new transit projects. The centerpiece of every travel demand
forecasting model is the mode choice model, which traditionally does not
include a network effects variable to account for spatial autoregression. This
non-inclusion of network effects in the model formulation causes an omitted
variable bias which becomes visible in the mode-specific constant term, as
shown in Goetzke (2003). The result is, therefore, a systematic forecasting
error where transit ridership in suburbs with low transit mode share are
overestimated and transit ridership in the central city with high transit mode
share are underestimated.
In the traditional mode choice model approach, with everything else
being equal, the mode-specific constant term for transit use captures the
difference in indirect utility between transit use and the alternative mode (in
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this case: drive-alone trips). If this mode-specific constant term is not allowed
to change in space, a person in the suburbs with low transit ridership will be
forced to have the same average differential indirect utility for transit use over
driving alone as the person living in the central city with high transit ridership.
However, in reality, network effects are responsible for the fact that a person
living in a transit-unfriendly suburb derives less differential utility from
choosing transit over driving with the car, than the person living in the transitfriendly city.
It should now be easy to see that as long as the differential utility for
using transit in the suburbs is lower than average, and in the central city, higher
than average, transit ridership will be overestimated in the suburbs and
underestimated in the central city. Figure 3.3 demonstrates graphically how not
including the network effects variable into the model leads to an omitted
variable bias in the regression.

Figure 3.3 about here

This new insight might at least partially explain why new rail starts in
the past decade have had problems with inflated ridership forecasts compared
to the observed ridership after opening (Pickrell, 1989; Kain, 1992). Since the
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federally funded rail projects studied by Pickrell serve mostly the commuter
market from the suburbs to the CBD, the systematic bias in the mode choice
model caused by unaccounted for spatial autoregression stemming from
network effect could be responsible for overestimating ridership. Not
accounting for network effects may have also dwarfed the forecasts of Tren
Urbano in Puerto Rico, which is in 2005 less than a third of the originally
expected ridership (Green, 2005).

CONCLUSION
I have shown that network effects play a role in mode choice decision
making. However, the theory only allows for spatially autoregressive binary
mode choice models because of the spatial weight matrix character (Wm*),
with m* taking on the value of either zero or one, but never a larger number.
Given what was discussed in this paper about spatially autoregressive binary
mode choice models, it is not difficult to extend the general concept to
multinomial or even nested mode choice models. The spatial lag term
representing the network effects is just the average mode share of all the
spatially weighted neighbors. By replacing the social interaction with spatial
dependency, this concept can easily be included in the model structure
proposed by Páez and Scott (2005).
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An extension of the mode choice model would be to not only include
network effects on the origin side of the trip, but also on the destination side of
the trip. Intuitively, this makes a lot of sense since people make their mode
choice decision based on both origin characteristics and on destination
characteristics. LeSage and Pace (2005) find an elegant solution for designing
the appropriate spatial weight matrix.
While the estimation of a spatially autoregressive mode choice model is
feasible as long as the data is collected on the basis of spatial sampling, the real
challenge poses the inclusion of network effects in mode choice forecasting for
new infrastructure investment projects. In traditional mode choice models, the
mode share is exclusively determined by the social characteristics as well as
trip costs – both being assumed to be exogenous. Network effects, however,
lead to the fact that a portion of the trip cost (WTP for using the mode with
others) itself becomes endogenous. At the same time, one does not know what
the individual preference for using the transportation mode together with other
people would be.
This problem is somewhat similar to the issue of congestion in the
mode choice model, where a portion of the trip cost (congestion cost) also
becomes endogenous. As part of the travel time variable, it is assumed that the
congestion cost effects everyone the same way as an average congestion cost
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does. When faced with this problem, the typical resolution for deriving model
forecasts is a simulation approach, where the model results are iteratively
looped until convergence is reached.
In the context of network effects, the simulation approach assumes that
socio-economic characteristics are exogenous and will not change with the
implementation of new transit facilities, which essentially means that improved
public transit triggers nobody to move. Such an assumption is unrealistic, since
the social composition of a neighborhood is, of course, endogenous with
respect to transportation infrastructure. This problem even exists for traditional
mode choice models, but may be alleviated by including a land-use model.
However, network effects do magnify the problem. People move into the
neighborhood because of the new transportation infrastructure and will use this
mode now available. In addition, the new residents will also trigger already
older residents to switch to the newly available transportation mode. Therefore,
a mode choice model that includes network effects has to always integrate a
land-use model when deriving forecasts.
In the context of the four-step transportation model, I am convinced that
not just the mode choice step is spatially autoregressive, but also the trip
generation model and the trip assignment model. LeSage and Polasek (2005)
discuss the possibility of spatial autoregression in the trip distribution model.
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Naturally, people in the central city make more, but shorter trips than their
suburban counterparts. They also tend select their destinations, i.e. shopping,
based on the destinations of others. Especially in congested cities, people might
even choose their routes on what is conceived as being the fastest way, but may
actually become slower because of these route choice network effects causing
congestion. After all, the actual decision making in difficult traffic conditions
will always lack full information with the result that assignment flows may be
in a continuous disequilibrium, or in equilibrium, but with network effects.
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Figure 3.1: Positive network effects for an individual person in
their mode choice decision.

WTP for
one trip

The willingness to pay
for one trip increases
with higher mode share

Mode share
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Figure 3.2: Geo-coded locations of all surveyed households in New York City.
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Table 3.1: Estimation results for the New York City mode choice model.

Transit Mode Constant
(drive alone = 0, transit = 1)
Total Travel Time (0, 1)

Basic Model

Model with
Network Effects

Model with Network Effects
Controlling for Car Access

-0.079
(0.194)

-1.047**
(0.248)

-1.001**
(0.250)

-0.036**
(0.006)

-0.035**
(0.006)

-0.036**
(0.006)

1.887**
(0.293)

1.813**
(0.296)

Average Network
Effect for Transit Use (1)

2.174
(1.591)

Additional Transit Network
Effect for No Car Access (1)
No Car Access Dummy (1)

4.258**
(0.398)

3.893**
(0.404)

2.463*
(1.041)

Destination Manhattan (1)

1.991**
(0.201)

1.831**
(0.207)

1.819**
(0.207)

High Income Dummy (1)

-0.242
(0.157)

-0.311
(0.161)

-0.309
(0.161)

-0.702**
(0.159)

-0.735**
(0.163)

-0.730**
(0.163)

1,652

1,652

1,652

-534.03

-512.75

-511.80

0.528

0.546

0.546

Male Dummy (1)
Sample Size
Log-likelihood
Pseudo-R2
*significant at the 5%–level
**significant at the 1%–level
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Figure 3.3: In the presence of network effects transit utility increases with
higher transit mode share. However, if network effects are not included
into the model, transit utility is forced to be constant, which leads to an
omitted variable bias. Therefore, transit ridership will be systematically
underestimated in the suburbs (v1 < v2), and overestimated in the central
city (v1 > v2).

Transit utility
Network effects included (v1)

Network effects not included (v2)

Suburb Average transit
mode share
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Central city

Transit mode share

Chapter 4
Bicycle Use in Germany: Explaining Differences
between Municipalities with Social Network Effects
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INTRODUCTION
The bicycle modal split in German cities differs significantly. It ranges
from a low of less than five percent in the state capital, Wiesbaden, to a high of
more than one-third in the university town, Münster. Conventional wisdom
would refer to Wiesbaden’s hilliness to explain the small number of bicyclists,
and to Münster’s young average age in Münster to explain the opposite pattern
there. A city’s physical environment (i.e. its topography, infrastructure, socioeconomic composition, including age and the trip characteristics) plays a
dominate role in determining how many people use their bike. The results of
Siu et. al. (2000) and Rieveld (2004) support the importance of these
municipal traits. In this paper, I apply a binary discrete choice model, which
includes not only these traditional variables, but also a measure of the city’s
“biking culture”. I find that the probability of a person riding a bicycle
increases with the city’s level of “biking culture”.
“Biking culture” is best described as a social interaction or spill-over
phenomenon, where a larger number of bicyclists make it more likely that
some other person will also ride a bike. In the literature, this subject matter is
discussed as neighborhood or social network effects (Shy, 2001; Goetzke,
2006a). In the last few years innovative econometric approaches were
developed to empirically test for these social network effects (Brock and
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Durlauf, 2001; 2002; Paez and Scott 2005; 2006; Dugundji and Walker, 2005;
Goetzke 2006b). This study is not only the first bicycle choice model for
Germany, 10 but also the first to use municipal-level social network effects
reflecting “biking culture” to explain bicycle modal share differences across
cities. 11 If social network effects indeed play a significant role in whether or
not people choose a bike as their transportation mode, then approaches to
bicycle policy may shift to building and supporting a “biking culture” rather
than exclusively to improving infrastructure. In general, bicycle infrastructure
results from biking culture, while good bicycle infrastructure does not
necessarily improve biking culture.
The next section provides an overview of the data used and develops an
explanatory framework. Then I introduce a methodology to capture biking
culture through social network effects and develop an econometric model.
Finally, I finish with a policy discussion and conclusion.

10

All German bicycling studies are restricted to either qualitative or univariate statistical
analysis.
11
As of now, no mode-choice model has dealt with city-wide network effects.
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PREVIOUS LITERATURE,
EXPLANATORY FRAMEWORK, AND DATA
Using data from the 2002 nationwide survey of travel behavior,
“Mobility in Germany – MiG 2002” (BMVBW, 2003), I build a binary logistic
regression model to analyze municipal differences in bicycle mode choice
decision making.
Few regression models have been developed to explain the difference
in bicycle use between cities within a country. For Germany, just two studies
compare bicycle behavior across cities (Pez, 1998, Flade et. al., 2002), but
neither employs a regression model. Rietveld and Daniel (2004) used an
aggregate regression model with data from 103 Dutch municipalities. They
found that besides socio-economic and demographic variables, weather and
bicycle infrastructure have statistically significant impacts on bicycle mode
share. In the only discrete choice model looking at municipal differences in the
bike modal split, Siu et. al. (2000) determined that a topography dummy
variable is positive and significantly different from zero. Rave (2005) provides
an excellent overview of the empirical bicycle studies.
Explanatory variables used in these regression models, as well as in
other research papers, such as single-city bike choice models (Ortuzar et. al.,
2000), can be grouped into three categories:
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1. Individual characteristics: Sex, age and income are considered the
most important personal variables to determine bicycle use. Males are
typically more likely to use a bike, while bicycle riding decreases with
age. Poor people tend to ride their bike more often.

2. Trip characteristics: Trip length and weather are the typically included
determinants of bicycle use. Longer trips, and bad weather are not
conducive to biking.

3. Municipal characteristics: Empirical evidence points to biking
infrastructure and topography as having a significant impact on
bicycling. People are more likely to bike if the biking infrastructure is
good and if the topography is flat. In some aggregate regression
analyses, such as in Rietveld and Daniel (2004), other municipal
characteristics, e.g. city size and density are used as a proxy for
average trip length. In this study, which uses a discrete choice model,
the inclusion of trip length renders these variables as unnecessary.
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The MiG 2002 provides most of the data described above. The basic
sample has 25,000 household records, 61,000 person records and 180,000 trip
records. The additional regionally extended samples (Aufstockungstichprobe)
bring the total up to approximately 50,000 households, 100,000 persons, and
400,000 trips.
Using the extended samples for the state of Nordrhein-Westfalen
(Northrhine-Westphalia), as well as for the metropolitan area of Frankfurt, the
region of Hannover, as well as the transportation districts of Nordhessen
(North Hesse) and Bremen/Niedersachsen (Lower Saxony), I could identify a
total of 32 cities larger than 50,000 inhabitants. The dataset with these 32 cities
had more than 30,000 trips, which was reduced to around 10,000 trips after
trips of persons less than 15 years old, weekend trips, trips longer than 100 km,
business trips, and return trips were removed. However, I could derive
bicycling infrastructure proxies for only 24 of the 32 municipalities, which
brought the final sample size to 8,725, with each city subset having at least 100
trip records. Table 4.1 exhibits the summary statistics, as well as the source for
all variables included in the model.

Table 4.1 about here
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Included variables describing individual characteristics are male, age,
and low income. Since I have only information on income groups, I have
aggregated the three lower income groups (monthly net household income less
than 1,500 Euro) into a “poor” dummy variable. This dummy variable
represents a bit more than one-eighth of the population, which coincides with
the German poverty data.
Our model uses three variables, trip length, bad weather, and trip
purpose for trip characteristics. A bad weather dummy was set to one if the
conditions reported in MiG were either rain or snow. The trip purpose was
split up into five categories: work trips, educational trips, shopping trips,
leisure trips and all other trips (includes doctor visits, running an errand, etc).
The three variables included as municipal characteristics are
topography, biking infrastructure and social network effects. None of these
variables were part of the MiG survey. A flat topography dummy was set to
one as long the city center and most of the area within the city did not appear
as hilly by looking at topographical maps. I verified the results by telephone
interviews with city officials. The flat topography values for each city are
reported together with the other important municipal characteristics in Table
4.2.

82

Table 4.2 about here

This dataset only has information about travel time and distance for the
chosen mode, but not for all the alternative modes, as is typically for
McFadden-type travel demand models (McFadden, 1974). Thus, a different
approach had to be found to control for each municipality’s unique
infrastructure. To avoid multicollinearity between variables, the additional
challenge was to find an infrastructure variable that does not correlate with the
social network effects variable (we discuss this issue in the next section). Two
different approaches were used to derive a social network effects variable:

1. We conducted a telephone survey for 20 cities to find the bike lanes
length in each municipality (in km). This value is divided by the
population to calculate the bike lane length per 1,000 inhabitants. It
would have been preferable to compute bike lanes per area, but in
Germany the municipal boundaries are politically determined and do
not reflect the urbanized area. A city’s reported area often includes
small, annexed villages where most of the land use is for agriculture or
forestry.
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2. In 2005, the German Federation of Bicyclist (ADFC) undertook a
survey where people evaluated the bicycle infrastructure in their city
(ADFC, 2005). Using the mean of both, accessibility for infrastructure
quantity and average speed for infrastructure quality, I aggregate a bike
infrastructure score which is ranging between a low of 0 for the worst
infrastructure and a high of 5 for the best infrastructure. However, the
data was available for only 17 cities.

While the “Bike Lane per Capita” variable seems to be more objective,
bicyclists typically make decisions based on a personal, highly subjective
assessment of the bicycle infrastructure. This may be better captured in the
“Infrastructure Score” variable. The infrastructure proxies are highly
correlated with each other, having for the 13 common cities in the two datasets
a correlation coefficient of 0.675, which is significant at the 2-percent level.
This result is some indication that both infrastructure variables may capture
essentially the same effects.

METHODOLOGY AND ECONOMETRIC MODEL
Goetzke (2006a) introduces the theory of social network effects as it
applies to transportation mode choice decision making. Interpreting social
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network effects as a signal that biking is safe and reliable, 12 the paper’s main
claim is that the utility of taking a bicycle increases with its mode share.
Therefore, the more people using a bike, the more attractive a bike becomes to
all other people. These social spill-over effects lead to positive demand-side
network externalities, which I also refer to as biking culture in this paper.
In the last few years, several articles developed different approaches to
econometrically model these social network effects. Based on the theoretical
work by Brock and Durlauf (2001; 2002), Dugundji and Walker (2005) and
Goetzke (2006b) used a social network effects approach to model travel
demand. While Dugundji and Walker took zonal modal spit averages as a
proxy for social network effects, Goetzke extended this approach to a spatially
autoregressive mode choice model with moving mode share averages. Because
of the different nature of the dataset, which includes more than one
municipality, neither of these two methods is applicable for this paper.
In the spirit of the previous papers, I could have taken the average
modal split for bicycling in each municipality as the proxy for social network
effects. Because of the endogeneity of the biking culture proxy, however, this
approach may exhibit a correlation between the social network effects variable
and the error term, leading to a biased regression coefficient estimate.

12

Just like a full restaurant is a sign for good food and satisfied customers.
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Therefore, the model requires an instrument that is correlated with the social
network effects variable but not with the error term.
To create such an instrument, I have taken the trip purpose category
(work and educational trips, shopping trips, leisure trips, and all other trips)
and removed one trip purpose at a time from the dataset to get four different
subsets. Then, the bicycle mode share derived from the excluded trip purpose
records could be used as the instrument for the social network effects.
A total of four new datasets were generated: one excluding work and
educational trips (bike mode share of work and educational trips is the social
network effects variable); one excluding shopping trips (bike mode share of
shopping trips is the social network effects variable); one excluding leisure
trips (bike mode share of leisure trips is the social network effects variable);
and one excluding all the other trips (bike mode share of other trips is the
social network effects variable). The first column of Table 4.3 shows the
correlation coefficients between the instrumental variables for biking culture
and the total municipal bicycle mode share, an indicator of social network
effects used in previous studies.

Table 4.3 about here

86

The social network effects instrument captures municipal biking
culture only as long as they are neither correlated with an omitted variable, nor
with an included variable, such as biking infrastructure. Ignoring the
infrastructure variable should upwardly bias the network coefficient because of
the positive correlation between social network effects and infrastructure
(omitted variable bias). On the other hand, if the infrastructure proxy is highly
correlated with the social network effects variable, then coefficients of both
variables may be adversely affected by multicollinearity.
Column 2 and 3 of Table 4.3 report the correlation coefficients between
the social network effects proxies and the two infrastructure variables
introduced in the previous section. The bicycle modal split for work and
educational trips is correlated with the infrastructure score at the one percent
significance level, the bicycle modal split for shopping trips is correlated with
the infrastructure score at the five percent level, and four other correlations are
significant at the ten percent level.
When I combine all three groups of determinants for bicycling choice,
municipal, trip, and individual characteristics, a structural form of the binary
logistic regression model can be derived as follows:
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Bike = α + β* individual characteristics + γ*trip characteristics
+ δ*municipal characteristics + ε

(1)

Equation (1) ties together all the previous information. Male, age and
the poverty dummy were used as individual characteristics. Included trip
characteristics were trip length, a bad weather dummy, as well as the trip
purpose (work, educational, shopping, leisure and other trips). Finally, the
social network effects instruments, either of the two infrastructure proxies, and
a flat topography dummy were taken as municipal characteristics.
In order for the regression estimation to be unbiased, the error terms
should not be correlated with any of the independent variables which is a
reasonable assumption. The social network effects instrument will actually
capture all the remaining city-level autocorrelation in the error term, while, at
the same time, not being correlated with the error term, because it is an
exogenous instrument (bike mode share of the excluded trip purpose).
Another assumption of the model set-up is that there is no self-selection
of the residential location. Since I analyze the city as a whole, and not specific
neighborhoods, this assumption is expected to be met since few people will be
choosing a city to live in just because of its biking culture. In this context, it
may be also important to mention, that the dataset includes only trips where
the bicycle is used predominately as a mode of transportation, not as a
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recreational tool. All the trips which recorded leisure as the trip purpose refer
to the leisure activity undertaken at one of the trip ends.
At this point, however, the reader needs to be cautioned about one
issue. Each municipality has a different level of biking culture represented in
the social network effects variable. The regression coefficient for the social
network effects estimates just the average impact of this biking culture on
bicycle mode choice for all the cities combined. Unfortunately, a city-specific
coefficient estimate is statistically impossible to obtain because the social
network effects instruments would essentially become a municipal dummy. It
would account for the average effect of all omitted city-level variables that
would otherwise enter into the error term.

MODEL AND RESULTS
We evaluated eight models, two subgroups with four different data sets,
respectively. The first subgroup includes bike lanes per capita for 20
municipalities as the infrastructure proxy, while the second subgroup uses the
bike infrastructure score existing for 17 cities. Each of the four different data
sets excludes one trip purpose (work and educational, shopping, leisure or
other trips) so that the bike mode share for the excluded trip purpose could be
used as the social network effects instrument. Tables 4.4(a) and 4.4(b) present

89

the regression results. Most regression coefficients are significantly different
from zero at the five-percent level or better and, with one exception discussed
below, the signs are as expected.

Tables 4.4(a) and 4.4(b) about here

In all eight models, the social network effects regression coefficients
have the expected positive sign, and are significantly different from zero at the
one-percent level. This is a strong indication that municipal biking culture
plays an important role in bicycle mode choice decision making. Therefore, a
strong biking culture raises the probability that a person will ride the bike,
ceteris paribus.
As seen in Table 4.4 (a), the regression coefficients for bike lanes per
capita also have the expected positive sign, and are significantly different from
zero at the ten-percent level or better. But if the infrastructure variable is used
instead, the sign of the regression coefficient in Model (5), which excludes
work and school trips, becomes unexpectedly negative at the one-percent
significance level. All other regression coefficients are still positive and
significantly different at the one-percent level.
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The “wrong” sign for the bike lane coefficient in Model (5) may be
explained by multicollinearity between the infrastructure measure and social
network effects proxy, which are both correlated with each other at the onepercent level (see Table 3). This multicollinearity will likely result in the
infrastructure score picking up some remaining effects from an omitted
variable.
The effects of all the other included variables are as follows. Flat
topography is more conducive to biking, as seen in the corresponding positive
sign of the regression coefficient, which is in all cases significantly different
from zero at the five-percent level or better. The longer the trip, the fewer
people ride the bike. This relation ship is expressed in the trip length
regression coefficient, which is always negative at the one-percent significance
level. In bad weather, people are less likely to use their bicycle, causing the
corresponding regression coefficient to have a negative sign which is
significantly different from zero at the one-percent level at all times.
If compared to the base trip purpose (which is leisure in three models,
and other trips in the remaining one), people prefer to ride the bike to work and
especially to educational destinations (positive signs for both the work and
educational trip coefficients are always significantly different from zero at the
one-percent level). For all other trip purposes the regression coefficient is not
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significantly different from zero at the ten-percent significance level. Only in
Model (8) is the shopping trip regression coefficient negative, and significantly
different from zero at the five-percent level, making it a less preferred bike trip
compared to the base trip purpose (leisure trip).
Males are more likely to use the bike, signified by a positive regression
coefficient, which is always significantly different from zero at the one-percent
level. On the other hand, age never has a statistically significant effect on
bicycle riding. Finally, in two of the models using bike lanes per capita as the
infrastructure measure, the poverty dummy has a significant positive effect at
the five-percent level, providing some evidence that biking is an inferior good.
Multicollinearity may explain the low level of significance of the age and
poverty coefficient estimate. Both variables are correlated with the trip purpose
categories. For example, work trips are undertaken by people who are typically
not poor, and people taking educational trips tend to be young.
The magnitude of the regression coefficients estimated do not change
between the eight models, and, in most cases, the actual values are very close
together. This result supports the fact that the model specification is robust,
especially given the somewhat different set of municipalities the two
subgroups cover.
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In summary, the regression results show that social network effects,
such as a varying biking culture in different cities, play an important role in
determining a person’s probability to ride the bicycle. The outcome, however,
hinges on the assumption that the models control sufficiently for all other
effects, especially the ones positively correlated with social network effects,
such as infrastructure. Given the robustness of the model’s regression
coefficient estimates for social network effects, I believe that this assumption
is a reasonable one.

POLICY DISCUSSION
Transportation planners typically believe that the most important policy
for increasing bicycle mode share is to improve biking infrastructure (Nelson
and Allen, 1997). The basic argument is that better facilities will lower the
cost, and hence will increase the consumption of biking. In general, the model
supports this policy approach, as the positive marginal effects of the
infrastructure proxies reported in Tables 4.5(a) and 4.5(b) show.

Tables 4.5(a) and 4.5(b) about here
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Because of the easier interpretation, only bike-lanes-per-capita is used
for the discussion of the infrastructure variable. Depending on which trip
purpose is excluded, its marginal effects range between 0.05 and 0.10, with an
average of 0.075. This means that for a city of 100,000 inhabitants, building 1
km of bike lanes (or 0.01 km per 1,000 capita) will add 0.00075 to an average
person’s probability to ride the bike, or 0.075 percentage points. In other
words, if a city invests in about 13.3 km of new bike lanes, the bike choice
probability would go up by approximately one percentage point, say from 10
percent to 11 percent.
The model also included a second policy variable, social network
effects capturing aspects of biking culture. Its marginal effects are shown in
Tables 4.5(a) and 4.5(b). The values for the marginal effects for social network
effects lie between one-third and two-third, again depending on which trip
purpose is excluded.
The excluded trip purpose can be used to identify the relative
dependence of each trip purpose on social network effects and which one less.
Again, only the dataset with the bike-lane-per-capita variable is used for ease
of interpretation. The two models with the lowest marginal effects for the
network instruments are the ones excluding other trips (0.34) and shopping
trips (0.46). This means the trip purposes that depend most heavily on social
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network effects are other trips and shopping trips. The trip purposes most
independent of social network effects are work and education trips, as well as
leisure trips, since the marginal effect of the datasets excluding these two trip
purposes were 0.53 and 0.65, respectively.
It makes sense that social network effects are not so important for
leisure trip. People take their bicycle for recreation, because they enjoy it and
not because they see other people riding their bike. While social network
effects become more important for work and educational trips, they still do not
have such an impact if compared to shopping and other trips. The reason may
lie in the fact that for work and educational trips people evaluate the bike mode
in comparison to their other alternatives whose cost can be significantly higher
as long as congestion and parking for the automobile are included (infinite for
people who do not have access to a car, such as young people with an
educational destination). And public transit may make the trip much longer if
access, wait, transfer and egress times are accounted for, in addition to the cost
of being sometimes unreliable.
It is not at all surprising that shopping and other trips are the most
sensitive to social network effects. People may only get the idea to go
shopping or see the doctor by bicycle as long as they are inspired by others
who do the same. This analysis indicates that both shopping and other trips
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have the highest potential for increasing their bike mode share following if a
city’s biking culture improves.
In reality, however, better infrastructure for bicycles and improved
biking culture complement, rather than supplement each other. Of course, if a
new bicycle facility increases the bike modal split, this higher bike mode share
will, in return, have a positive impact on social network effects. At the same
time, municipalities with a strong biking culture are more inclined to invest in
bicycle infrastructure. Hence, there may be some truth to the claim that not
only biking culture is endogenous to bicycle infrastructure, but also vice versa.
On the other hand, while better bicycle facilities will decrease the cost
of biking, the lower cost may not necessarily prompt people to start riding the
bike, as long as nobody did before. This is the deeper insight of the model
results: If people already use their bike, infrastructure improvements will carry
a double dividend, one from the lower biking cost and one through the social
network effects. If nobody did ride the bicycle before the infrastructure
improvement, however, it may very well be possible that the better biking
facility will not increase bike ridership. Therefore, in the later case, the focus
of bicycle policy should be foremost on improving the city’s biking culture.
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CONCLUSION
This research adds a new dimension to the bike policy discussion by
finding that the quantity and quality of bicycle infrastructure is not the only
policy variable determining a city’s bike mode share, but that in this context
biking culture, or social network effects also needs to be considered. Whether
or not focusing on improving biking culture turns out to be more cost-effective
than building better bicycle facilities, however, remains to be researched.
The regression results presented in this paper show that municipal
biking culture has an important impact on the probability of choosing the bike
as a transportation mode. To quantify the importance of these social network
effects, I additionally ran a regression with the whole dataset (no trip purpose
excluded) using just a city-specific dummy variables to capture infrastructure,
topography and social network effects combined. Then I regressed both
infrastructure (bike-lanes-per-capita) and topography together on the cityspecific dummy variables, and finally added in another regression a newly
derived social network effects measure (the city’s bike mode share for all
trips). The result was that the first two variables account for approximately
40% of the variation, while social network effects account for another 45%
(see Table 4.6).
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Table 4.6 about here

This alternative approach confirms that biking culture, controlled for
infrastructure and topography, has explanatory power. If the social network
effects instrument would not be included, it is expected that an omitted
variable bias will develop, making the model inconsistent. The bias will then
most likely be captured in the infrastructure variable, which is strongly
correlated with social network effects.
The result that social network effects are important is also visible in the
city-specific dummy coefficient estimate for Münster, which was not
significantly different from zero even at the ten-percent level. The
interpretation of the result would be that in Münster nothing deters people
from riding the bike. As the average person is indifferent between using the
bicycle and all the other transportation modes, the bike must be viewed as
essentially equal to any other transportation mode. On the other hand, the
dummy regression coefficients of all the other cities have a negative sign and
are significantly different from zero at the one-percent level. This result shows
that Münster, which is considered the biking capital of Germany and where
one third of all trips are done by bicycle, has indeed a stronger biking culture
than the other cities included in the study.
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Bike mode choice and biking culture may be a simultaneous process,
possibly making the social network effects variable endogenous. The
consequence would be that the coefficient estimate for social network effects is
upwardly biased. My approach to circumvent this problem was to use an
instrument derived from the excluded trip purpose records.
Another

simultaneous

process

could

be

biking

culture

and

infrastructure, which would explain the correlation between both variables.
This means that the model may exhibit some level of multicollinearity. The
coefficient estimates of all other variables would be still unbiased, but the
model as a whole would become less robust. However, except for model (2),
all the regression coefficients in the models are stable.
All together, this paper presented an innovative approach to analyze
bicycle mode share differences in German municipalities, which could change
the way bike policy is conducted in the future. The results of the models
emphasize the importance of the city’s biking culture as a determinate of an
individual’s probability to choose the bike as the mode of transportation.
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics for included model variables.
Source

N

Min.

Max.

Mean

S.E.

Bike Trips

MiG 2002

8,725

0

1

0.12

0.003

Bike Share (Work &
Education)

MiG 2002

8,725

0

0.41

0.15

0.001

Bike Share (Shopping)

MiG 2002

8,725

0

0.42

0.11

0.001

Bike Share (Leisure)

MiG 2002

8,725

0

0.34

0.12

0.001

Bike Share (Other Trips)

MiG 2002

8,725

0

0.34

0.11

0.001

Bike Lanes per Capita

Phone
Survey

6,634

0.26

1.16

0.69

0.003

Bike Infrastructure
Score

ADFC

7,834

1.13

3.67

2.39

0.008

Flat Topography

Own
derivation

8,725

0

1

0.77

0.005

Trip Length

MiG 2002

8,725

0

96

6.70

0.111

Bad Weather

MiG 2002

8,725

0

1

0.21

0.004

Work Trips

MiG 2002

8,725

0

1

0.22

0.004

Educational Trips

MiG 2002

8,725

0

1

0.04

0.002

Shopping Trips

MiG 2002

8,725

0

1

0.29

0.005

Leisure Trips

MiG 2002

8,725

0

1

0.28

0.005

Other Trips

MiG 2002

8,725

0

1

0.18

0.004

Male

MiG 2002

8,725

0

1

0.45

0.005

Age

MiG 2002

8,725

15

91

46.45

0.184

Poor

MiG 2002

8,725

0

1

0.14

0.004
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Table 4.2: Municipal characteristics used in the model.
Flat
Topography

Total Bike
Share

Bike Lane per
Capita*

Aachen

1

10.3%

0.47

Arnsberg

0

7.6%

0.64

Bielefeld

1

6.9%

1.10

2.31

Bonn

1

12.2%

0.80

2.59

Darmstadt

1

19.1%

1.16

2.07

Delmenhorst

1

21.0%

Düsseldorf

1

18.4%

Frankfurt

1

9.5%

Hamm

1

8.5%

Hanau

1

8.0%

Hannover

1

14.3%

0.71

2.94

Kassel

0

1.0%

0.35

1.34

Köln

1

9.9%

Marburg

0

9.4%

1.03

Münster

1

35.4%

0.98

3.67

Neuss

1

6.2%

0.50

2.28

Offenbach

1

3.8%

0.64

Oldenburg

1

25.3%

0.94

Recklinghausen

1

2.8%

0.79

Rüsselsheim

1

11.8%

1.02

Velbert

0

4.2%

1.14

Viersen

1

11.0%

0.94

Wesel

1

16.8%

0.94

3.42

Wiesbaden

0

2.4%

0.26

0.72

Municipality

* in km per 1,000 capita
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Bike Infrastructure Score

2.52
0.61

1.15
1.76

0.87

2.64
1.70

1.60

3.16

2.78

Table 4.3: Coefficients for the correlations of the network proxies with
total bike model share and the two different infrastructure variables.
Network Proxies (Based on
the Bike Mode Share of
Excluded Trip Purpose)

Total Bike
Mode Share

Bike Lane
per Capita

Bike Infrastructure
Score

Work and Education

0.901***

0.295

0.782***

Shopping

0.927***

0.407*

0.541**

Leisure

0.872***

0.335

0.475*

Other

0.789***

0.426*

0.421*

*** significant at the 1-percent level
** significant at the 5-percent level
* significant at the 10-percent level
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Table 4.4(a): Binary logistic regression results for bicycle trips using “Bike Lanes
per Capita” as the infrastructure measure. The network effect proxy is the bike
mode share of the excluded trip purpose.

Constant Term
Network Effects
Bike Lanes per Capita
Flat Topography
Trip Length
Bad Weather

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-3.708***
(0.256)
5.248***
(0.703)
1.028***
(0.268)
0.423**
(0.192)
-0.052***
(0.010)
-0.467***
(0.125)

-3.218***
(0.256)
4.279***
(0.662)
0.525*
(0.280)
0.665***
(0.178)
-0.084***
(0.010)
-0.364***
(0.122)
0.306***
(0.113)
0.672***
(0.190)

-3.960***
(0.316)
6.112***
(0.805)
0.814***
(0.283)
1.318***
(0.198)
-0.196***
(0.017)
-0.443***
(0.126)
0.748***
(0.138)
1.027***
(0.216)
-0.012
(0.127)

-3.250***
(0.245)
3.126***
(0.560)
0.492*
(0.268)
1.011***
(0.168)
-0.093***
(0.010)
-0.417***
(0.113)
0.316***
(0.112)
0.682***
(0.188)
-0.207*
(0.107)

Excluded

Base

Base

Excluded

0.264***
(0.097)
-0.004
(0.003)
0.017
(0.133)
4,779
2,944.73

0.266***
(0.086)
0.000
(0.003)
0.237**
(0.118)
5,457
3,686.91

Work Trips

Excluded

Educational Trips

Excluded

Shopping Trips
Leisure Trips
Other Trips
Male
Age
Poor
Sample Size
- 2 Log-Likelihood

-0.152
(0.108)

Excluded

Base

Base

-0.243*
(0.125)
0.268***
(0.094)
-0.001
(0.003)
0.320**
(0.126)
4,927
3,180.09

-0.242*
(0.125)
0.402***
(0.093)
-0.001
(0.003)
0.207
(0.128)
4,739
3,175.93

*** significant at the 1-percent level
** significant at the 5-percent level
* significant at the 10-percent level
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Table 4.4(b): Binary logistic regression results for bicycle trips using “Bike
Infrastructure Score” as the infrastructure measure. The network effect proxy is
the bike mode share of the excluded trip purpose.

Constant Term
Network Effects
Bike Infrastructure
Score
Flat Topography
Trip Length
Bad Weather

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

-3.349***
(0.261)
6.690***
(0.782)
-0.261***
(0.096)

-3.440***
(0.259)
3.893***
(0.661)
0.249***
(0.079)

-3.875***
(0.311)
5.877***
(0.743)
0.262***
(0.075)

-3.504***
(0.251)
3.136***
(0.470)
0.306***
(0.070)

1.1529***
(0.253)
-0.061***
(0.009)
-0.610***
(0.116)

0.926***
(0.251)
-0.087***
(0.009)
-0.534***
(0.115)
0.218**
(0.103)
0.542***
(0.176)

1.198***
(0.292)
-0.190***
(0.015)
-0.520***
(0.115)
0.643***
(0.123)
0.933***
(0.197)
-0.033
(0.111)

1.072***
(0.242)
-0.099***
(0.010)
-0.528***
(0.106)
0.247**
(0.103)
0.573***
(0.175)
-0.188**
(0.096)

Excluded

Base

Base

Excluded

0.254***
(0.086)
-0.003
(0.003)
-0.157
(0.122)
5,675
3,678.07

0.210***
(0.078)
-0.002
(0.002)
0.037
(0.110)
6,444
4,455.02

Work Trips

Excluded

Educational Trips

Excluded

Shopping Trips
Leisure Trips
Other Trips
Male
Age
Poor
Sample Size
- 2 Log-Likelihood

-0.153
(0.096)

Excluded

Base

Base

-0.184*
(0.110)
0.208**
(0.084)
-0.002
(0.002)
0.103
(0.115)
5,819
3,981.92

-0.177
(0.110)
0.376***
(0.084)
-0.003
(0.003)
0.058
(0.120)
5,564
3,827.32

*** significant at the 1-percent level
** significant at the 5-percent level
* significant at the 10-percent level
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Table 4.5(a): Marginal effects for regressions (1) through (4).
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Network Effects

0.5252

0.4622

0.6468

0.3393

Bike Lanes per Capita

0.1029

0.0567

0.0861

0.0534

Flat Topography

0.0423

0.0718

0.1395

0.1097

Trip Length

-0.0052

-0.0091

-0.0207

-0.0101

Bad Weather

-0.0467

-0.0393

-0.0469

-0.0453

Work Trips

Excluded

0.0331

0.0792

0.0343

Educational Trips

Excluded

0.0726

0.1087

0.0740

-0.0152

Excluded

-0.0013

-0.0225

Base

Base

Excluded

Base

Other Trips

-0.0243

-0.0261

Base

Excluded

Male

0.0268

0.0434

0.0279

0.0289

Age

-0.0001

-0.0001

-0.0004

0.0000

Poor

0.0320

0.0224

0.0018

0.0257

Shopping Trips
Leisure Trips
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Table 4.5(b): Marginal effects for regressions (5) through (8).
(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

Network Effects

0.7201

0.4348

0.6494

0.3524

Bike Infrastructure
Score

-0.0281

0.0278

0.0290

0.0344

Flat Topography

0.1241

0.1034

0.1324

0.1204

Trip Length

-0.0066

-0.0097

-0.0210

-0.0111

Bad Weather

-0.0657

-0.0596

-0.0575

-0.0593

Work Trips

Excluded

0.0243

0.0711

0.0278

Educational Trips

Excluded

0.0605

0.1031

0.0644

-0.0165

Excluded

-0.0036

-0.0211

Base

Base

Excluded

Base

Other Trips

-0.0198

-0.0198

Base

Excluded

Male

0.0224

0.0420

0.0281

0.0236

Age

-0.0002

-0.0003

-0.0003

-0.0002

Poor

0.0111

0.0065

-0.0173

0.0042

Shopping Trips
Leisure Trips
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Table 4.6: Regression results for city-specific dummies as the dependent variable.
(1)

(2)

-3.947***
(0.296)

1.456**
(0.652)
0.992**
(0.387)

-3.784***
(0.296)
8.497***
(1.138)
0.607*
(0.337)
0.387*
(0.205)

Sample size

17

17

Adjusted R2

0.41

0.86

Constant Term
Network Effects
Bike Lanes per Capita
Flat Topography

*** significant at the 1-percent level
** significant at the 5-percent level
* significant at the 10-percent level

110

Chapter 5
Conclusion

111

While transportation planners were always aware of social network
effects in transportation mode choice modeling, recently they have gained
more interest for academic researchers. My three dissertation essays give
further insight in both the theoretical foundation as well as the empirical
analysis of social network effects in mode choice modeling.
In my first, more analytically oriented essay, I start out by developing a
mode choice model with just one transportation mode, which I later extend to
include a second, alternative mode. I describe social network effects as a
coordination externality with the potential problem of having a Nash
equilibrium that is not welfare maximizing. In this context I shed new light on
the collapse of transit ridership in the United States after World War II.
The other two essays are econometric applications of social network
effects. In the second essay, I investigate social network effects in transit
ridership using travel behavior data from New York City. In the third essay, I
explain bike mode share differences in German cities through social network
effects. In both cases I had to deal with the problem of social network effects
being endogenous. In the New York dataset, I resolved the issue by choosing
to use a spatially autoregressive process for social network effects. For the
German dataset, I decided to derive an instrument from records with excluded
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trip purposes. Both models empirically indicate the existence of social network
effects for transit use in New York and bicycling in Germany, respectively.
The main contribution of the dissertation, however, is to emphasize the
importance of social network effects for transportation policy. This issue runs
through all three essays like a red thread. In the theoretical essay, I establish
the possibility that there exist multiple mode share equilibria, and that a city’s
mode share is path-dependent. Hence, certain unique historical events may
result in irreversible changes to transportation mode shares. Then, in the
second essay, I show that ignoring social network effects may lead to an
omitted variable bias, with the result of systematically overestimating
suburban transit ridership, and underestimating transit ridership in the CBD.
Finally, in my third essay, I contrast biking policies relying on infrastructure
improvement with a policy approach that considers strengthening the city’s
biking culture.
At the end of a research project, one always recognizes what could
have been done better. This, of course, applies to my dissertation as well,
which I interpret as a sign of successful learning. The two issues in need of
further investigation would be the endogeneity of social network effects and
the self-selection of residential location choice. A possible improvement for
the first issue of endogeneity may be a simultaneous equation approach with a

113

linear probability model formulation, while a nested logit choice model could
help to alleviate the second issue of self-selection.
I see this dissertation as the beginning of my research agenda, in laying
the groundwork for the topic of social network effects in transportation mode
choice modeling, which I will build upon. I plan to improve the modeling
approaches by addressing the endogeneity and self-selection issues in future
papers.
Another problem in these models is that residential location choice
depends on transportation infrastructure. To complicate the issue, residential
location choice, again, will depend on social network effects. While the
Tiebout model does not explicitly include social network effects in such a way
as it is modeled in my dissertation, voting by feet is an expression of social
network effects. Hence, based on the methodological fundaments laid in my
dissertation, it would be a challenging but also exciting exercise for me to
improve present-day land-use and residential choice model by treating
transportation infrastructure as endogenous and accounting for social network
effects, as well.
Two similar fields of social network effects applications in urban and
regional economics are immigration and fertility decision making. The two
research areas are especially interesting for me as a German, coming from the
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country with the lowest reproduction rate in the world and, therefore, more
than ever dependent on immigration. Both these issues are inherently
interlinked: It is expected that with the depopulation of German cities, some
cities are in danger of collapse, while other cities may even continue to grow,
mainly do to interregional as well as international immigration. As a sideline, I
should mention that the cities currently growing also have a highest
reproduction rate (and not rural areas).
I expect that the concept of social network effects with its many
applications will become more important in future policy analysis. The
revelation of the dynamic character inherent to social network effects will
deepen the insight of any policy issue to be analyzed, and therefore strengthen
the derived recommendations. Better access to improved modeling techniques
will make empirical estimations of social network effects more operational for
planners and consultants.
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